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Abstract. Most evil is compatible with the existence of God if He has an aim 
that He can achieve only by using an unguided process of evolution and if He 
cannot be condemned for trying to achieve His aim. It is argued that there is an 
aim that could reasonably be attributed to God and that God cannot achieve it 
without using evolution. Th ere are independent grounds for thinking an evolu-
tionary response is necessary if God is to be defended at all. Issues that require 
further investigation are pointed out and desirable features of the evolutionary 
response indicated.
INTRODUCTION
If God is a moral agent and if it is therefore appropriate to judge Him in 
light of moral standards of right and wrong, and good and bad, then any 
adequate response to the evidential problem of evil must involve the theo-
ry of evolution by variation and natural selection. Evolution enables us to 
show that, in most cases, neither natural nor moral evil gives us reason to 
doubt the existence of God qua moral agent, provided that He could have 
a purpose that requires Him to use a process of evolution that He does not 
control and in which He does not intervene, and provided that the value 
of achieving the goal outweighs the disvalue of the suff ering and death 
that evolution by variation and natural selection inevitably involves. Th e 
only possible evils that cannot be explained in this way are those in cases 
in which God does not intervene miraculously to prevent them aft er He 
has achieved His aim – and the existence and number of such cases de-
pends on His aim. Moreover, evolution is necessary to explain some evils 
in a way that exonerates God qua moral agent, which means that if there 
is no evolutionary response, there can be no complete response. 
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In arguing for the foregoing claims, the fi rst step is to distinguish this 
project from the free-will and the soul-making responses. Th e second 
is to suggest an aim such that God would need to use an unguided evo-
lutionary process in order to achieve it. Th e aim suggested will be the 
development of persons who are capable of freely desiring, and of freely 
committing themselves to, a relationship with God. Th e third is to show 
that the occurrence of an unguided evolutionary process explains most 
natural and moral evil. Th e fourth is to argue that it is impossible to 
exonerate God qua moral agent without relying on evolution. Since the 
purpose of this paper is just to show that evolution must play a role in 
any adequate response to the evidential problem of evil and not to pro-
vide an actual defence or theodicy, there will be no attempt to go further. 
Once the argument is complete, I will briefl y discuss the possibility that 
evolutionary ethics puts a question mark against the greater good ap-
proach, the consequent implications for our understanding of the nature 
of God, and a couple of ways of dealing with any residual evils. I will fol-
low with some brief evaluative remarks.
A NEW APPROACH
One philosopher neatly summarizes the two prevailing approaches as 
follows: “According to the ‘free-will defence’, evil and suff ering are neces-
sary consequences of free-will. Proponents of the ‘soul-making argument’ 
. . . argue that a universe which is imperfect will nurture a whole range 
of virtues in a way impossible either in a perfect world, or in a totally evil 
one.”1 Soul-making also involves freedom. “[It] is the process by which 
. . . agents freely and autonomously come to develop and perfect certain 
valuable traits of moral character and to know and to love God.”2 
Th e position here is distinguishable from the free will response in 
that evil is not primarily the consequence of the possession of free will 
by individuals but a concomitant of the only process that can bring into 
existence organisms that are capable of freely committing themselves to 
God, and freely desiring to do so. Th e argument is not that “if God grants 
1 Peter Harrison, “Th eodicy and Animal Pain,” Philosophy 64 (1989), pp. 79-92: 79. 
2 G. Stanley Kane, “Th e Failure of Soul-Making Th eodicy,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 6 (1975), pp. 1-22: 1.
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us signifi cant freedom, he cannot control how it will be used.”3 On the 
view here, if there are objective and independent moral standards, there 
will be evil in some possible worlds in which no free agents ever develop. 
Moreover, for all that is said here, free agents need not be responsible 
for any evil, although they certainly can be responsible for some. Th e 
position here is also distinguishable from the soul-making argument in 
that it need not be the case that the function of freedom is to enable 
a process of soul-making, or that the desirability of soul-making justifi es 
the existence of most evils. It is possible to hold that God wants there to 
be beings capable of acting freely without intending that there be any 
soul-making at all. In sum, the position here neither presupposes nor 
entails either the free-will or the soul-making theodicy; it is independent 
of them. 
Naturally, the aim attributed to God in this paper is speculative: there 
is no way to demonstrate that it is His aim. However, it is also speculative 
that God particularly wants to create beings with free will and specula-
tive that God’s aim is soul-building. Indeed, any response to the eviden-
tial argument from evil must be speculative. Strictly speaking, the most 
that can be shown is that the evil that we observe does not count against 
the existence of God because He could have a good reason to permit it. 
When it comes to good reasons for permitting evil, the evolution-
ary response is far more powerful than some of its extant competitors. 
For instance, Swinburne’s contention that natural evils are somehow 
educational is implausible.4 Swinburne talks of other animals “learning” 
from the fate of a fawn: “It is good for the fawn caught in the thicket 
in the forest fi re that his suff ering provides knowledge for the deer and 
other animals who see it to avoid the fi re and deter their other off spring 
from being caught in it.”5 Th e trouble is that some deer starve to death 
in places like Canada every winter but other creatures appear to have 
learned nothing about avoiding hunger as a result. In contrast, as we will 
see shortly, the evolutionary response has no diffi  culty with such cases. If 
3 David Basinger and Randall Basinger, “Th e Problem with the Problem of Evil,” Re-
ligious Studies 30 (1994), pp. 89-97: 91.
4 See the works of Richard Swinburne, starting with his “Natural Evil,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 295-301.
5 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998, p. 103.
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God has an aim that can only be achieved through an unguided process 
of evolution and if He cannot be condemned for trying to achieve it, then 
starving deer will not undermine the response at all. Neither will any of 
the other cases of injury, disease, death, and extinction that we know to 
have occurred in the course of evolution. Since it cannot be argued that 
evolution could take place in a world that is radically diff erent from the 
actual one in relevant respects and since evolution occurs as a result of 
diff erences in viability and fertility, it appears to be literally impossible 
for the advocate of the evidential argument from evil to discover coun-
ter-examples that can be used to undermine the evolutionary response. 
Th e power of the evolutionary response is a good reason to explore it. 
WHY THE ABILITY TO ACT FREELY MUST BE 
A PRODUCT OF EVOLUTION
As for God’s purpose, let us suppose that God wants there to be persons 
who are capable of freely desiring to enter into a relationship with Him 
and of freely committing themselves to the relationship. I shall refer to 
such persons as “relationship-capable persons.” When it comes to how 
relationship-capable persons could possibly come into existence, there 
are four cases to consider. First, there is the case where God manufac-
tures them, where manufacturing them means either creating them fully 
formed by fi at, or by establishing initial conditions and deterministic 
laws of nature in a world that will inevitably bring them into existence. 
Second, there is the case where God establishes the initial conditions 
and laws of nature in an indeterministic universe and then uses artifi cial 
selection to develop relationship-capable persons. Th ird, there is the case 
where evolution does not occur and individuals sometimes chance to 
desire to enter into a relationship with God. And, fi nally, there is the case 
where God establishes the initial conditions and laws of nature in an in-
deterministic universe and leaves it alone in the hope that relationship-
capable persons will eventually evolve. Relationship-capable individuals 
can come into existence only in the last set of circumstances. Th e pos-
sibility that God might nurture individuals as a parent nurtures children 
is not an additional option because the capacity for free action is not an 
acquired characteristic. 
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As for the fi rst possibility, God cannot manufacture relationship-
capable persons. Th e argument against the possibility of manufactur-
ing them involves considering the possibilities with respect to people 
and their relationship with God: people will either desire to some posi-
tive degree to enter into a relationship with Him, or be indiff erent as 
to whether they do so, or be positively disinclined to do so. Now, on 
the one hand, if God manufactured relation-capable persons who had 
characteristics that inclined them to enter into a relationship with Him, 
then God would have contributed to bringing it about that they desired 
to enter into the relationship and to the extent that God had contributed 
to bringing it about that they desired to enter into the relationship, they 
would not freely desire to do so. 
Consider an analogy. If someone trains a watchdog to attack trespass-
ers, he is responsible for its actions if it attacks someone. He would also 
be responsible if he genetically modifi ed the watchdog so that training it 
was unnecessary. And, he would be even more responsible if he stipulat-
ed the entire genome of the attack animal. To the extent that the trainer 
is responsible for the watchdog’s attacking someone, the watchdog does 
not attack freely. Similarly, if God specifi ed the genetic make-up of an 
individual, God would be responsible for the individual’s actions. He 
would be all the more responsible if He determined all the situations 
the individual would confront. In general, if another agent is responsible 
for what a person does, then the latter does not act freely – if a puppe-
teer controls the outcome, the puppet’s movements are not free. Hence, 
manufactured individuals who wanted to enter into a relationship with 
God would not do so freely. Th is would be true even in a world in which 
compatibilism was true: compatibilism does not relieve people who train 
watchdogs of their responsibility and it would not relieve God of respon-
sibility either. 
On the other hand, if God manufactured people with characteristics 
that made them indiff erent or disinclined, then He would be creating 
persons who did not desire to enter into a relationship with Him. It fol-
lows that, whatever God did in the way of manufacturing individuals, 
He could not create precisely the kind of persons that, by hypothesis, He 
wants to create. To return to the original formulation of the claim, God 
cannot manufacture persons who freely desire to enter into, and to com-
mit themselves to, a relationship with Him. John Hick holds that God 
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could have created free individuals by fi at but in fact used evolution.6 
Ignoring the fact that Hick’s stance entails that God is a sadistic monster, 
because He would have no good reason to choose more suff ering over 
less and an evolutionary process would involve more suff ering than fi at 
creation, fi at creation is a form of manufacturing and the argument here 
is that free individuals cannot be manufactured at all. 
Now, consider the case in which God uses artifi cial selection. In this 
case, God does not create fully-formed relationship-capable persons. He 
is therefore not responsible for all of their characteristics. However, when 
there is evolutionary competition between individuals who are more 
likely to have relationship-capable descendants and individuals who are 
less likely to have them, God intervenes in such a way that the former win 
the competition. He might do this by, say, by intervening to prevent the 
latter from producing as many off spring as the former even if objective 
environmental conditions were such that they were not at a disadvantage 
with respect to fertility. Th e trouble is that someone who bred watchdogs 
to do a particular kind of action when certain conditions obtained would 
be responsible for their actions of that kind in those kinds of circum-
stances. Similarly, God would still be responsible for the fact that people 
are relationship-capable. As contended above, if another agent is respon-
sible for an agent’s actions, then the latter does not act freely. In this case, 
God would be responsible for people desiring to enter into a relationship 
with Him and for their committing themselves to the relationship when 
they did enter one. Hence, they would do neither of these things freely. 
Consequently, God could not “breed” relationship-capable persons. Ar-
tifi cial selection off ers no advantages over manufacturing when it comes 
to producing relationship-capable persons as defi ned.  
Th ird, although God could create an indeterministic world com-
plete with inhabitants that occasionally chanced to want to enter into 
a relationship with Him, such individuals would be incapable of truly 
committing themselves to the relationship: what chance could bring into 
existence, chance could eliminate, and commitment cannot be a matter 
of chance. It is also questionable whether we could accurately describe 
individuals who just chanced to desire to enter into a relationship with 
God as persons who freely desired to enter into the relationship: random 
6 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, London and New York: Macmillan, 2007.
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events are not free actions and, similarly, desiring something by chance 
is not the same as desiring it freely. 
Th erefore, God’s only option is to create an indeterministic universe 
in which it is possible for relationship-capable persons to evolve and to 
leave it alone in the hope that they will evolve. If God wants there to be 
relationship-capable persons as defi ned, then God must “use” evolution. 
Th is situation diff ers from the pure chance situation because, while it is 
true that it would be a matter of chance whether relationship-capable 
persons evolved, it would not be a matter of chance, once they did exist, 
whether they desired to enter into a relationship with God, whether they 
committed themselves to God, or whether they remained committed to 
Him. Th is type of claim is frequently true in biology, which increases 
its credibility in the present case. For instance, while it is a matter of 
chance that mammals predominate on our planet, it is not a matter of 
chance that mammals nurse their young when they have them. Animals 
that nurse their young evolved through a series of accidents but there 
was selection for the retention of the mutations that resulted in nursing 
because individuals with them were biologically fi tter than their com-
petitors. Moreover, God would not be responsible for anyone’s desires 
or commitments in a way that would preclude his freedom. In sum, God 
has no option but to “use” an unguided evolutionary process to “create” 
relationship-capable persons. Since it is possible that God wants to create 
relationship-capable persons, it is possible that God has a goal that can 
be achieved only by creating a world in which life originates in an inde-
terministic world and evolves, naturally and without interference. 
 
HOW EVOLUTION DISPOSES OF EVILS
Let us continue to assume that God wants to create relationship-capable 
persons.7 As just argued, He can achieve this only by creating an inde-
terministic universe in which life can arise and evolve into an array of 
complex forms and in which He does not intervene, allowing the evolu-
7 Fransisco Ayala also claims that evolution by variation and natural selection ena-
bles us to avoid condemning God but his argument is incomplete. Ayala does not discuss 
any possible goals for God or any sense in which He could be said to be good. See his 
Darwin’s Gift : To Science and Religion, Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press, 2007.
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tionary process to unfold without any guidance. Th e world will have to 
be a dynamic one: there will have to be changes that can drive evolution 
by altering the conditions in which organisms try to survive and repro-
duce. Of course, on the one hand, the world cannot be too dynamic: the 
changes must not occur so quickly that species become extinct too soon. 
On the other, it cannot lack dynamism: a world in which there was an 
ecological equilibrium and few mutations would be one in which little 
or no natural selection would occur. In short, the world will have to be 
one in which there are accidents, diseases, predators, natural disasters, 
and extinctions, albeit not an overwhelming number of them. In turn, 
this means that it will have to be a world in which there are many natural 
evils. It follows that natural evils do not constitute evidence against the 
existence of God unless He could achieve His aim without using evolu-
tion or there are reasons to condemn Him for trying to achieve it in the 
fi rst place. 
It might be thought that it is a reasonable objection that God could 
have achieved His aim in a world that is less or more dynamic than the 
actual world. In fact, such an objection would be pointless because there 
is an inverse relationship between how dynamic the world is and how 
long the process will probably take. If a less dynamic process takes longer 
than a more dynamic one, a less dynamic process means less suff ering 
per generation but more generations of suff ering while a more dynamic 
process means more suff ering per generation but fewer generations of 
suff ering. Provided that the process is not so fast that it burns itself out or 
so slow that it never gets very far, there will be little if anything to recom-
mend a more dynamic state over a less dynamic one, or vice-versa. 
Moral evil is no evidence against the existence of God either. If moral 
agents are products of evolution by variation and natural selection and 
if God must refrain from intervening in the process in order to achieve 
His aim, moral evils can arise whatever God might prefer. Indeed, moral 
evils are liable to arise, because it is highly probable that any moral agents 
that evolve will be morally imperfect. One reason that they will probably 
be morally imperfect is that imperfection is inevitable in the products 
of variation and natural selection and there is liable to be some moral 
imperfection as well. Another is that the biological interests of organ-
isms can confl ict with moral requirements. Yet another is that there will 
be variations in moral character just as there are with respect to other 
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features of organisms and there will always be some people at the ex-
treme ends of the continuum just by chance – there will be great poten-
tial sinners as well as potential saints. Whereas natural evils are a neces-
sary means to the end, since they are needed to drive the evolutionary 
process, morally imperfect beings that do wrong would be an inevitable 
by-product of the process. It follows nevertheless that the existence of 
moral evil is no reason to condemn God either, again unless there is 
reason to condemn his goal. 
As the preceding paragraphs make clear, an evolutionary approach 
would provide a comprehensive explanation of evil, explaining both nat-
ural and moral evils very readily, which is a great advantage. In fact, the 
ease and comprehensiveness naturally moves one to wonder whether it 
can really be that easy. Th e answer is affi  rmative. Unless there are cases in 
which God does wrong by omission aft er He has achieved His aim, there 
appears to be nothing that we consider an evil that is neither caused by 
the dynamic nature of the world we inhabit, nor brought about by amoral 
organisms that have evolved in the world, nor brought about by morally 
imperfect moral agents – moral agents who are imperfect because they 
are also products of the evolutionary causal processes that are driven 
by the dynamic nature of the world. Th e fi rst category includes fl oods, 
earthquakes and hurricanes; the second includes bacteria, viruses, para-
sites, and predators; and the third includes crime, indiff erence, and ideo-
logical insanity of the kind that dominated the 20th century. Th ere are no 
other kinds of evil in addition to these three. 
Another advantage of an evolutionary approach is that it makes it 
unnecessary to come up with explanations for most particular instances 
of evil – such as the starving deer of Canada mentioned earlier. Evil is an 
inevitable or highly probable concomitant of an unavoidable process if 
God needs to use an evolutionary process in which He does not intervene 
in order to achieve his aim. From an evaluative standpoint, it is enough 
to know that the process will bring about a variety of evils; explanations 
for particular instances of evil will oft en be causal, not moral. We do not 
have to justify the death by starvation of individual deer in terms of the 
putative benefi ts of their deaths. If there is no reason to condemn God 
for using evolution to achieve His goal, there is no reason to condemn 
Him for the consequences of the process. 
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WHY EVOLUTION IS NECESSARY TO DISPOSE OF EVIL
Th e fundamental argument to the eff ect that an evolutionary defence is 
necessary to avoid a moral condemnation of God qua moral agent is as 
follows. Th e independent scientifi c evidence is such that there can be 
no reasonable doubt that an evolutionary process has occurred on our 
planet.8 It is also such that there can be no doubt that the evolutionary 
process involves pain, suff ering, and death, and is the cause of a great 
deal of what we consider evil. Th ere would be a very great deal of pain 
and suff ering even if we took into consideration only the pain and suff er-
ing of actual and potential human moral agents, i.e., relationship-capable 
persons. It follows that if we are to avoid condemning God, then the 
evolutionary process is necessary for some reason. When it comes to 
avoiding a condemnation of God in the face of the evils that we observe, 
any realistic option must include an evolutionary response. 
Anyone who wanted to deny that an evolutionary response is a nec-
essary part of any realistic option would have to hold that evolution is 
merely a façade behind which God is working out His purposes. One 
problem with this is that it adds unnecessary complexity. Another is that 
too many events are too distant, temporally or spatially or both, for us 
to be able to show that they have all served some specifi c purpose. In-
deed, there are too many contemporary events for us to demonstrate 
that they all serve a purpose. Since there is not even the beginning of 
an explanation in many cases, the contention that the matter is beyond 
our understanding is really an appeal to ignorance: it amounts to declar-
ing that the critic cannot prove that there is no good, non-evolutionary, 
reason for the evils that we observe and that, therefore, there is, or could 
be, a reason. Naturally, it would be possible to invoke free-willed demons 
in response to natural evil.9 One problem with doing so is that it would 
also be necessary to explain why God allows their continued existence. 
More importantly, there is no independent evidence for their existence 
or activities. In contrast, as already mentioned, there is plenty of inde-
pendent evidence that evolution has occurred and that the world is of 
such a nature that evolution can take place. Th e germ theory of disease 
8 See Kenneth R. Miller, Finding Darwin’s God, New York: Harper Collins, 1999, for 
a survey of the evidence for evolution and against a variety of creationist alternatives.
9 See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, London: Allen & Unwin, 1974. 
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has ousted the demon theory and the evolutionary theory of natural evil 
ought to oust the demon theory as well. 
Th ere are some theists who deny that evolution occurs. No doubt, 
they will want to reject the contention that an evolutionary response 
to the evidential problem of evil must be part of any realistic response. 
In order to try to prevent them from doing so, I shall present an ex-
ample that shows that it is not necessary to make an explicit appeal to 
the occurrence of evolution in order to show that only an evolutionary 
response will do. Th e example is one in which the evidence for a state of 
aff airs is non-evolutionary but in which the only way to ensure that God 
can avoid condemnation is to account for it in evolutionary terms. Th e 
example could be multiplied many times over. 
Th e example involves an argument from imperfection, which requires 
a bit of explanation. Th e existence of imperfections is compatible with 
there being an evolutionary explanation for a feature and with its being 
the case that the feature is highly advantageous in most circumstances. 
In an evolutionary world, everything is jerry-built and jury-rigged, and 
peculiarities and drawbacks are inevitable. An argument from imperfec-
tion is to the eff ect that if the feature were created by an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and omnibenevolent Being other than through the use of 
evolution, then the feature would exist, it would be advantageous, but it 
would be without the attendant drawbacks unless they were inseparable 
from the feature for some reason. An example that can be used to illus-
trate the argument is the human eye. It always has two fl aws: the nerves 
that bundle together to form the optic nerve attach to the front of the 
retina and the optic nerve goes through the middle of the retina.10 Th e 
attachment of the nerves to the front blurs our vision and the hole in the 
middle of the retina creates a blind spot. Th ere is no necessity to the ar-
rangement, which we know because the eye of the squid has nerves that 
attach to the back of the retina. Th erefore, the human eye has eliminable 
defects, a designer with the attributes of God would do better, and hence 
the human eye is not a product of divine design. 
Turning to the example itself now, there are evils caused by the exis-
tence of cognitive biases that render human beings less than optimally 
rational in some circumstances. For instance, one cognitive bias is con-
10 See George C. Williams, Th e Pony Fish’s Glow, New York: Basic Books, 1997.
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fi rmation bias, which is the tendency to look for confi rming evidence 
and to fail to look for potentially disconfi rming evidence that is equally 
or more important.11 Th is does not have to do with a moral fl aw in hu-
man beings but with a cognitive one: it is not a matter of people believing 
what they want to believe for some reason because it occurs in cases in 
which people have no stake in the outcome of the inquiry. It can lead to 
things like unjust racial stereotypes, because people notice behavior on 
the part of members of racial groups when the behavior conforms to the 
stereotype, fail to notice behavior that does not conform to it, and incor-
rectly conclude that the stereotype is true. Another widespread cognitive 
defect is that many human beings are more suggestible than is either 
necessary or desirable. It is possible to implant false memories of being 
lost in a mall in a quarter of the subjects.12 Leading questions alone can 
result in false memories.13  
Whatever the explanation for the origin of these tendencies, they are 
not always conducive to morally positive outcomes. Th is is obvious in 
the case of racial bigotry. However, it is also easy to imagine how a com-
bination of confi rmation bias on the part of investigators and suggest-
ibility on the part of children being questioned could, say, result in false 
allegations of child abuse. Th is is undesirable not merely because inno-
cent people can be falsely accused but also because, in the long run, false 
accusations in some cases will undermine the credibility of children gen-
erally, which will make it more likely that real child abusers will be able 
to get away with their crimes. 
If human beings have to be products of evolution by variation and 
natural selection in order for God to achieve His purpose in bringing 
them into existence, the evil that results from cognitive biases does not 
support the contention that there is eliminable evil in the world and, 
therefore, that there is no God. In contrast, there are grave diffi  culties 
11 See Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confi rmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998), 175-220.
12 See Elizabeth Loft us and Jacqueline Pickrell, “Th e Formation of False Memories,” 
Psychiatric Annals 25 (1995), 720-725. For a general discussion of human memory as well 
as this phenomenon, see Daniel Schachter, Th e Seven Sins of Memory, Boston: Houghton 
Miffl  in, 2001.
13 Loft us points out that leading questions can result in false memories. See Elizabeth 
Loft us, “Make-Believe Memories,” American Psychologist 58 (2003), 867-873.
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if God is responsible for the characteristics that His creations possess. 
For instance, the free will defence fails. False allegations of child abuse 
produced by confi rmation bias and suggestibility do not occur because 
people have free will and have used their free will to do wrong. Instead, 
they occur because people are fl awed inquirers. Indeed, with confi rma-
tion bias and human suggestibility, even the most selfl ess and well-in-
tentioned investigators would sometimes fall into error unless they were 
aware of their biases and took steps to obviate their infl uence. Moreover, 
the tendencies were only discovered in the 20th century, so no one could 
have been aware of them until recently. As for soul-building, the biases 
prevent people from acting in a morally responsible way even if they want 
to, so it is hard to see that they do anything but prevent soul-building. 
Even if confi rmation bias and suggestibility were useful in normal 
circumstances, the evidence for imperfection is that they lead us astray 
in some cases; and that there are now people who know of them, who 
still function adequately, and who are less susceptible to the kind of mor-
al mistakes to which people ignorant of them are susceptible. Since peo-
ple who learn about suggestibility and confi rmation bias can eliminate, 
or compensate for, their infl uence without any adverse consequences, 
neither is necessary for a greater good. A creator who had the usual at-
tributes imputed to God and who created us without using evolution 
could have made us better than we actually are. Th e only possible excuse 
for Him is that He needs to use unguided evolution to achieve His aim. 
Since God could have made us so that we were neither suggestible nor 
susceptible to confi rmation bias (when inappropriate), the occurrence 
of any evil that can be attributed to those fl aws means that there is elim-
inable evil in the world – unless God must use an evolutionary process in 
which He cannot interfere. 
Th e example does not presuppose the truth of evolution. We do not 
need to appeal to evolution to learn that cognitive biases exist or to dis-
cover that they can cause us to act in ways that are not ethically optimal. 
In sum, we do not need evolution to set up the example but we do need 
it to respond to it adequately. 
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OPEN ISSUES
Th e evolutionary response has been presented as a greater good re-
sponse. Th ere is a background assumption that God is justifi ed in creat-
ing a world in which life can evolve despite the suff ering involved be-
cause relationship-capable persons are worth it. In fact, however, evolu-
tion may actually put the greater good approach in doubt. It will put it in 
doubt if evolution has not merely produced true beliefs about a pre-ex-
isting moral reality but has created morality itself. Th is seems to be a real 
possibility. I have myself put forth an argument that evolution by varia-
tion and natural selection can produce objective moral facts to which we 
have intuitive access.14 Th e reason evolution might thus put the greater 
good response into doubt is that a morality that is a product of evolution 
cannot justify the very process that brought it into existence. In light of 
the possibility that evolution has created morality itself, it cannot just be 
assumed that value “transcends” the physical world and its inhabitants. 
Hence, any response that takes a greater good approach, that assumes 
that God is a moral agent, but that fails to include a demonstration that 
morality is independent of the biological realm, will be fundamentally 
incomplete.15 
Furthermore, if morality itself is a product of evolution, the prevail-
ing concept of God will have to be modifi ed. If morality is a product of 
evolution, moral agents will be products of evolution as well. If morality 
and moral agents are products of evolution, not only will there be no 
greater good in light of which we can evaluate God and judge Him as 
though He were a moral agent, but also God will be outside the range 
of the kind of moral evaluation that is properly applied to moral agents. 
In that case, the goodness of God could not be glossed as moral perfec-
tion – He could not be viewed as a moral agent who never does wrong 
and who never does a bad thing. Instead, He would have to be accounted 
wholly good merely from the perspective of relationship-capable per-
14 See Brian Zamulinski, Evolutionary Intuitionism: A Th eory of the Origin and Nature 
of Moral Facts, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007.
15 For examples – in addition to Hick and Swinburne – of this kind of defective ap-
proach, see: Keith Ward, Rational Th eology and the Creativity of God, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1982, and Robin Attfi eld, Creation, Evolution and Meaning, Burlington, VT, 
and Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. 
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sons – in the way natural phenomena are sometimes judged to be good. 
Naturally, a God whose goodness did not amount to moral perfection 
could still be a loving God. 
Finally, if relationship-capable persons have come into existence, it 
is necessary to explain why the evolutionary process continues and why 
God does not prevent evil from affl  icting relationship-capable persons. 
Th ere is more than one way to proceed. One way is to supplement the 
evolutionary response with one of the more traditional responses. Per-
haps, for instance, God wants both relationship-capable persons to exist 
and for them to undergo a process of soul-building. Another way is to 
attribute a more complex aim to God. Perhaps, He does not just want to 
create relationship-capable persons full stop but to create relationship-
capable persons who are willing to work to develop just and caring so-
cieties. In that case, He would not ordinarily rescue people when they 
needed saving but would leave the rescue to their fellow human beings. 
Also, in that case, it would be harder to discover evils that could consti-
tute evidence against God. Indeed, it might actually be possible to con-
ceive of an aim that made it impossible to discover such evils. 
It has been assumed in this paper that God’s aim is the creation of 
relationship-capable persons because the assumption made it possible 
to argue – without distractions – that God had to use evolution. It is 
now possible to suggest a more complicated hypothesis without the same 
possibility of confusion, although doing more than making the brief 
suggestion in the previous paragraph is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Whatever the aim we attribute to God, the evolutionary response greatly 
reduces the number of the evils that can potentially be used as evidence 
against the existence of God, if it does not eliminate them completely. 
SOME EVALUATIVE REMARKS
No matter the answers to the questions raised in the previous section, 
the necessity and desirability of the evolutionary response means that 
the only way forward is through attempts to answer them. Moreover, 
while an evolutionary response is necessary if God is to be defended at 
all, there are reasons to think that an evolutionary response ought to be 
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attractive to theists even if it were not necessary. First, as Derk Pereboom 
points out, the problem of evil “still constitutes the greatest challenge to 
rational theistic belief.”16 Without the evolutionary response, all that can 
be done with regard to natural evil is to “hold that God’s purposes for 
permitting evil are inscrutable; or . . . reject the assumption that gratu-
itous evil is incompatible with theism; or, fi nally, rely on evidence . . . in 
support of the existence of God in order to off set the negative evidential 
impact of the problem of natural evil.”17 None of the three options men-
tioned is both promising and satisfactory. Hence, evolution provides the 
foundation for a reasonable response in a situation in which other op-
tions are realistically unavailable. 
Second, by going beyond mere compatibility with evolution, the em-
brace transmutes evidence for evolution from evidence that has been 
thought to cause diffi  culties for theism into evidence that can be used 
to support theism indirectly by undermining the argument from evil. 
Th e argument does not deny God’s creation of the world but holds that 
God had to create a certain sort of world if He was to achieve His aim. 
All it undercuts is a 19th century variant of the argument to design that 
becomes implausible – even in the absence of evolutionary theory – once 
we start taking observable imperfections seriously. Of course, the notion 
that evolution is God’s method of creation is not new.18 What is new is 
the suggestion of a reason why God would use a process of evolution in 
which He does not intervene. Th ere is certainly a great deal to be said 
for an approach that enables theism to avoid confl ict with contemporary 
science. 
Finally, if God needs to use evolution in order to achieve His aim and 
if the evolution of human beings means that He has actually achieved 
His aim, humanity could once again be viewed as the crown of creation. 
It has been said that humanity has suff ered a crisis of confi dence be-
cause science has eliminated the justifi cation for thinking that we are 
special: Copernicus dislodged us from the physical centre of the universe 
16 Derk Pereboom, “Th e Problem of Evil,” Ch. 7 in William E. Mann, ed., Th e Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, 148-170: 167.
17 Nick Trakakis, “Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?” Interna-
tional Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 57 (2005), 35-66: 59.
18 Miller advances this contention in Finding Darwin’s God.
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and Darwin showed that we are just another animal.19 However, if God’s 
aim involves humanity in particular, that is, if we are the kind of being 
He wanted to bring into existence through the evolutionary process, it 
would be the case that the universe was created in order to bring beings 
like us into existence and there would be good reason for God to be 
especially concerned with us. Neither the obscure location of our planet 
nor the fact that we are products of evolution by variation and natural 
selection would give us any reason for doubt on these counts.  
 
CONCLUSION
Th e prevailing reactions on the part of theists to the idea of evolution 
by variation and natural selection range from extreme hostility to ac-
ceptance that theism and evolution are compatible. Th ose who go fur-
ther to say that evolution is God’s method of creation do not usually ex-
plain why He would use it. Th e view here is that evolution must be God’s 
method of creation; that it is possible that the reason He must use it is 
that He wants to create relationship-capable persons and evolution is the 
only way in which He can do so; that if He has to use evolution, then the 
argument from evil can be largely or completely neutralized; and that the 
argument from evil cannot be neutralized completely without appealing 
to evolution. If so, the prevailing reactions are not the most appropriate 
from a theist’s point of view. Since theism needs evolution, the appropri-
ate reaction is an enthusiastic embrace.
19 See Ayala for a relevant discussion. 
